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In 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court cleared up any
ambiguity regarding the application of the Federal Arbitration Act
1
(FAA) in Minnesota state courts, but also waded into untested
water (at least in Minnesota) regarding whether allegations that a
2
contract was void must be arbitrated. In a decision that sought to
retain some power for state law and state courts within the highly
deferential federal arbitration framework, the Minnesota Supreme
3
Court in Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC sided with a few federal circuit
4
courts and held that litigants who allege that their contracts are
void may initially ignore the arbitration clauses included in those

† Liz Kramer is an attorney at Leonard, Street and Deinard, practicing both
construction and general business litigation. After receiving her law degree from
the Yale Law School, Ms. Kramer clerked at the Minnesota Supreme Court during
the year that Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC was decided. Since that time she has
litigated issues of arbitrability on multiple occasions.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
2. See Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part I (discussing these cases).
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5

contracts. But just two-and-one-half years later, the United States
Supreme Court declared that the space Minnesota had attempted
to claim as the province of state law had already been annexed by
6
the FAA and the Supreme Court interpretation of the FAA. This
article will explore what remains of the Onvoy decision.
First, understanding Onvoy’s context requires a brief
introduction to the federal severability doctrine and the case law
interpreting it.
I.

PRIMA PAINT AND THE CIRCUITS’ ATTEMPTS TO NARROW IT

The FAA provides that a party aggrieved by the failure of
another to arbitrate may petition a United States district court and
“upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
7
arbitration.”
Under federal precedent, there is a strong
presumption of arbitrability, and doubts about the scope of
8
arbitrable issues are resolved in favor of arbitration. The cases
covered in this article discuss whether the threshold issue regarding
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement must also be heard
by an arbitrator or whether, in some instances, it can be heard by a
court.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided in Prima
9
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. that a party
resisting arbitration could not obtain a court hearing on all the
issues by asserting that the party had been fraudulently induced to
10
enter into the contract containing the arbitration provision.
Instead, the Supreme Court introduced what has since been
termed the “severability doctrine,” under which the arbitration
clause of a contract is essentially considered separately from the
5. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354.
6. See infra Part III (discussing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006)).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
8. E.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983) (noting that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” and “any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”).
9. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
10. Id. at 403–04.
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11

remainder of the contract. Only if the arbitration clause itself can
be attacked—such as, if a party was fraudulently induced to agree to
arbitration—may a court entertain the issue of arbitrability under
12
the Prima Paint decision.
The Supreme Court used broad
language in holding “therefore, that in passing upon a [9 U.S.C.]
§ 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court
may consider only issues relating to the making and performance
13
of the agreement to arbitrate.”
In the 1990s and early 2000s, some courts balked at the rigidity
of the severability doctrine. The Ninth Circuit confronted a case in
1991 in which California municipalities sought to avoid the
arbitration clause in each of their agreements with a securities
company by alleging that the individual who signed the agreements
14
on behalf of the municipalities lacked authority to bind them.
The Ninth Circuit allowed the municipalities to make their
argument in court. The court limited the application of Prima
Paint to “challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract” and
conversely found that the severability doctrine did not apply to
15
“challenges going to the very existence of a contract.” The court
summarized its distinction by stating that Prima Paint applies to
16
“voidable” contracts.
The Third Circuit later explicitly addressed which types of
complaints regarding a contract’s enforceability would be allowed
to stay arbitration under the FAA in Sandvik AB v. Advent
17
International Corp. In Sandvik, the two parties had executed a joint
18
venture agreement with a mandatory arbitration clause. But less
than three months after the agreement was signed, Advent notified
Sandvik that the individual who signed the agreement for Advent
had done so without authority and that Advent, therefore, would
19
not abide by its terms.
Sandvik brought suit for breach of
20
contract, and Advent moved to compel arbitration. The Third
Circuit noted a potential conflict in this case between the federal
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 404.
14. Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1138
(9th Cir. 1991).
15. Id. at 1140.
16. Id.
17. 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
18. Id. at 101.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 101–02.
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rule that “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
21
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit” and the severability
22
doctrine of Prima Paint. Because Sandvik did not raise an issue
that went “to the making and performance of the agreement to
23
arbitrate,” as required by Prima Paint, a plain reading of Supreme
Court precedent suggested Sandvik and Advent would have to
arbitrate.
The Third Circuit resolved the potential conflict by
“conclud[ing] that the doctrine of severability presumes an
24
underlying, existent, agreement.” After citing approvingly to the
25
Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co. decision
out of the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit “dr[e]w a distinction
between contracts that are asserted to be ‘void’ or non-existent . . .
and those that are merely ‘voidable,’ as was the contract at issue in
Prima Paint [sic], for purposes of evaluating whether the making of
26
an arbitration agreement is in dispute.”
Having set out that
framework, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a
motion to compel arbitration because the agent’s lack of authority
27
voided the agreement.
The Second Circuit addressed a similar set of facts just a year
after the Sandvik decision in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. Clarendon
28
National Insurance Co. In that case, Sphere Drake, a reinsurance
company, authorized Euro International Underwriting to accept
29
business on its behalf. Euro then entered into six reinsurance
contracts in 1997 and 1998, under which Sphere Drake reinsured
30
workers’ compensation insurance policies issued by Clarendon.
More than a year after the last contracts were executed, Sphere
Drake contacted Clarendon and attempted to nullify the contracts,
31
alleging that Euro never should have entered into them. There
was an arbitration clause in each contract, and after Clarendon
demanded arbitration, Sphere Drake brought an action in district
21. Id. at 105 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
22. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 105.
23. Id. (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404).
24. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 106.
25. 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).
26. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 107.
27. Id. at 111–12.
28. 263 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001).
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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court seeking a declaration that the contracts were void. Sphere
Drake contended that Euro breached its fiduciary duty by failing to
evaluate the reasonableness of the risks and, therefore, executed
33
contracts that were “economically disastrous” for Sphere Drake.
Sphere Drake argued was that the contracts were void because the
agent acted outside the scope of its agency, and the opposing party
34
was aware that the agent was acting outside of its authority.
In analyzing whether Sphere Drake had to arbitrate, the
Second Circuit noted that “the party putting the agreement to
arbitrate in issue must present ‘some evidence’ in support of its
35
claim before a trial is warranted.” In addition, it said that Prima
Paint can only be harmonized with cases saying that there must be
an agreement to arbitrate before it can be enforced by recognizing
36
“the distinction between void and voidable contracts.”
The
Second Circuit held that “[i]f a party alleges that a contract is void
and provides some evidence in support, then the party need not
specifically allege that the arbitration clause in that contract is void,
37
and the party is entitled to a trial on the arbitrability issue.”
Applying its interpretation of Prima Paint, the Second Circuit found
that Sphere Drake had only asserted evidence to suggest that one
38
of the six reinsurance contracts was void.
Sphere Drake only
offered evidence that Clarendon’s agent knew Euro was exceeding
its authority on one contract, not all six, so a trial was warranted
39
about the enforceability of only that one arbitration clause.
At this point, after at least three circuit courts had endorsed
the “void/voidable” distinction with respect to Prima Paint’s
application, the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to address
that issue in Onvoy.
II. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S ENDORSEMENT OF THE
VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION IN ONVOY V. SHAL
40

Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC forced the Minnesota Supreme
Court to confront the overlap between state and federal arbitration
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 32–33.
669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).
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law—something the court had not done in over two decades. In
overturning decisions from 1972 and 1982 regarding the
41
application of the Minnesota Arbitration Act, Onvoy clarified that
42
the FAA “applies to all transactions that involve or affect interstate
43
commerce.” That leaves very few transactions governed by the
44
Minnesota Arbitration Act: only those involving goods, labor and
supplies, exclusively from Minnesota, with only Minnesota
participants in the transaction. Even then, a clever litigator could
still argue for the application of federal law by showing how a
45
provincial transaction “affects” interstate commerce. In addition
to the applicability of the FAA, the substantive federal law of
46
arbitration also applies in Minnesota state courts.
The critical aspects of Onvoy remain unchanged: Minnesota
courts must apply, with rare exception, the FAA and the federal law
interpreting it to disputes over the enforcement of arbitration
clauses. The more groundbreaking and interesting aspects of
Onvoy, however, involved the void/voidable distinction regarding
the enforceability of arbitration clauses. The issue in Onvoy was the
impact of Onvoy’s arguments that its contract with SHAL was void
ab initio due to claims that the contract had been entered into ultra
47
vires and by interested directors. The Minnesota Supreme Court
48
adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Sandvik, such
adoption recognizing the unfairness of forcing parties to adhere to
49
any provision of a void contract—even the arbitration provision.
Following Sandvik, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Onvoy

41. MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08–.30 (2006).
42. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
43. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Minn. 2003) (citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1995)).
44. MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08–.30.
45. This argument would be made using commerce clause cases like Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which held that legislation restricting the uses of
even small amounts of home-grown wheat by farmers for local consumption could
impact interstate commerce. Id. at 127–29. A more recent example of this is
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that the
Controlled Substances Act could be constitutionally applied even to marijuana
grown by the intended user in a state where medical marijuana use is legal. Id. at
20–33.
46. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 351 n.4 (citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272).
47. Id. at 347.
48. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2000).
49. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that “parties may not be compelled to
arbitrate claims if they have alleged that the contract at issue never legally
existed”).
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declared that “allegations that a contract is void may be heard by a
court, even if not specifically directed to the arbitration clause,
while allegations that a contract is voidable must be sent to
50
arbitration.”
The void/voidable distinction implicates state law
because contract interpretation is governed by state, not federal,
51
law.
Applying those legal holdings to the facts of Onvoy, the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided that Onvoy’s claim that the
contract was entered into without authority was not sufficient to
52
make the contract void. Minnesota law recognizes two types of
ultra vires contracts: under the first, the contract will always be
outside the scope of the corporation’s power; under the second,
the contract is generally within the corporation’s power, but the
53
power was defectively exercised in that particular instance.
Onvoy’s claim was of the second type—an allegation that the board
of directors had not properly followed protocol in approving the
contract—and was, therefore, not automatically void in the opinion
54
of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Onvoy’s second claim, that the
individuals who negotiated the contract engaged in self-dealing
because they had close associations with SHAL, is governed by
55
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.255.
The statute creates the
possibility that a transaction is void due to self-dealing, but also sets
56
out four safe harbor provisions for accused parties. Therefore,
the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded to the district court to
determine whether the contract was void as a result of an
interested-director decision that was not excused by any of the safe
57
harbor provisions.
In the course of its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
58
expressed unease with federal law on arbitration. In footnote six
of the decision, the court cited a number of critiques of the federal
policy favoring arbitration and noted that its new rule “allowing
courts to retain jurisdiction over credible claims that a contract is

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 355.
53. Id. at 354–55 (citing Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 218, 113 N.W. 271,
273 (1907)).
54. Id. at 355.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 355–56.
57. Id. at 356.
58. See id. at 352.
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void[] leaves room for consumers to escape obvious abuses of
59
power in contracting.” The unease was more pronounced in the
concurrence of Justice Paul Anderson, who wrote about his
“concerns regarding the potential for abuse of power when parties
with unequal bargaining power contract to arbitrate their
60
disputes.” In particular, he expressed concern about individuals
61
waiving the right to a jury trial by agreeing to arbitration.
Justice Gilbert also wrote separately (dissenting in part) to
62
criticize the case law implementing the Federal Arbitration Act.
He said the statute “lends too much power to an arbitration system
that does not properly account for impartiality and a lack of legal
63
oversight.”
Because he thought federal law was headed in the
wrong direction, Justice Gilbert wanted Minnesota courts to “be
vigilant to preserve and improve Minnesota’s ADR system . . . and
. . . not be so eager to defer to the federal system unless clearly
64
required under federal law.”
Because of the policy statements from the Minnesota Supreme
Court suggesting concerns about state courts automatically sending
all parties to arbitration, the court’s decision to adopt the
void/voidable distinction can be seen in part as an attempt to
retain some power for state courts and lawmakers over who must
arbitrate. In a decision that acknowledges that Minnesota’s own
arbitration statute is rendered nearly impotent by the FAA, but that
expresses concern about the knee-jerk federal policy in favor of
arbitration, the court adopts the void/voidable distinction as an
exercise in drawing a line in the sand to demarcate a space for state
65
law on arbitration. Indeed, given the legal framework created by
the United States Supreme Court, the void/voidable distinction
may be the only vehicle for safeguarding Minnesota citizens from a
federal judiciary that could be called overzealous in its preference
for arbitration.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 352 n.6.
Id. at 357 (Anderson, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 359 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
See Onvoy, 699 N.W.2d at 344–59.
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III. BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING REAFFIRMS PRIMA PAINT AND REJECTS
THE VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided whether a
claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision was void
for illegality should go to the arbitrator or be heard by a district
66
67
court. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, a putative class
of plaintiffs entered into deferred-payment transactions with
Buckeye Check Cashing, and their agreements all contained
68
arbitration provisions. The plaintiffs sued in Florida state court
alleging that the agreements violated Florida lending and
69
consumer-protection statutes. Buckeye responded by moving to
70
The Florida Supreme Court refused to
compel arbitration.
compel arbitration because it worried that enforcing the
arbitration clause of an illegal contract “could breathe life into a
contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in
71
nature.”
In a brief opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Florida high court, rejecting the void/voidable distinction and
72
standing firmly on Prima Paint.
The Court repeated three
fundamental propositions on arbitration: 1) an arbitration clause
can be severed from the balance of the contract; 2) “unless the
challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first
73
instance;” and 3) these rules apply in state and federal courts.
After noting that the Florida Supreme Court relied on the
conclusion that the assertions of illegality would render the
Buckeye agreements void, the Court said unambiguously: “Prima
Paint makes this conclusion irrelevant.
That case rejected
application of state severability rules to the arbitration agreement
without discussing whether the challenge at issue would have
74
rendered the contract void or voidable.” The Court emphasized
66. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1207.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 894 So. 2d 860,
862 (Fla. 2005)).
72. Id. at 1208–11 (2006) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
73. Id. at 1209.
74. Id. (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400–04).
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that federal substantive law is applicable in state courts and that its
arbitration precedent had rejected the view that the severability
75
doctrine could be altered by state law.
The Supreme Court also addressed the respondents’ argument
76
that, since section 2 of the FAA limits the FAA’s application to
77
“contracts,” it is explicitly presumed that a valid contract exists.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, refused to “read ‘contract’ so
78
Considering all the uses of the term “contract” in
narrowly.”
section 2, the Court concluded that the term “must include
79
contracts that later prove to be void.”
Interestingly, however, the Court did include a footnote that
gave credence to the logical argument that someone should not
have to abide by an arbitration clause in a contract that never
existed:
The issue of the contract’s validity is different from the
issue of whether any agreement between the alleged
obligator and obligee was ever concluded. Our opinion
today addresses only the former, and does not speak to
the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents . . .
which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the
alleged obligator ever signed the contract, whether the
signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal,
and whether the signor lacked the mental capacity to
80
assent.
81
Among other cases, the Court cited to both Sandvik and Sphere
82
83
Drake in the footnote. Despite its strong language in the opinion
dismissing the void/voidable distinction created by lower courts,
the Court in footnote one recognizes (but does not address) that
there may be instances in which a party’s challenge to the contract
84
as a whole can be heard by the courts. But if those instances exist,
the Court apparently thinks they are very narrow.
The Supreme Court’s holding, read together with the
footnote, suggests that the Court rejected the void/voidable
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1208–09.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1209–10.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1208 n.1 (internal citations omitted).
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001).
Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1.
Id.
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distinction because the legal term “void” encompasses a greater
universe of cases than the Supreme Court thinks should be heard
by a court under the FAA. The instances in which a contract is
void, or of no effect, are defined by state contract law and can
include those that are against public policy, like that in Buckeye.
But Justice Scalia seems more sympathetic toward contracts that are
null and void because there never was a meeting of the minds. The
Supreme Court appears to be deferring for another day its decision
on whether an assertion that the party never assented to the
contract containing the arbitration clause, or that the signor lacked
authority, should be determined by an arbitrator.
Where, then, would the claims that Onvoy made regarding
why its contract was void fall—on the “clearly arbitrable” side of the
line drawn by the United States Supreme Court (along with
illegality), or on the “we’ll decide another day” side of the line?
Onvoy’s claims that its contract was entered into ultra vires, or
beyond the scope of authority, seem clearly analogous to the claim
in Sphere Drake that Sphere Drake’s agents acted outside their
85
authority. Given that Sphere Drake was one of the cases cited in
footnote one of the Buckeye decision, an ultra vires claim (which the
Minnesota Supreme Court found could be heard by a court)
appears still up for discussion. This type of claim is, accordingly,
on the “decide another day” side of the line.
Onvoy’s second argument, that its contract was entered into by
86
interested directors, straddles the line and illustrates how little
clarity the Supreme Court provided in the Buckeye decision about
the types of allegations impacting an entire contract that deserve a
court hearing. Unlike the cases in which the principal did not
assent to an agreement, the nullifying of a contract entered into by
interested directors is primarily a public policy determination of
the legislature. As such, this argument could be an “illegality”
argument that falls on the “clearly arbitrable” side of the line
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Buckeye. But to the extent that
self-dealing is also a breach of fiduciary duty and an activity that
falls outside of an agent’s authority, Onvoy’s second argument
could also be analogized to Sphere Drake and fall on the “decide
another day” side of Buckeye.

85.
86.

See Sphere Drake, 256 F.3d at 588; Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354–55.
See Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355–56.
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IV. HOW MINNESOTA COURTS AND LITIGATORS MAY PROCEED
Given this current framework, what space can a Minnesota
court legitimately claim as open for deciding the enforceability of
an arbitration clause? How can a litigator best argue that an
arbitration clause is either ineffective or must be enforced?
87
Armed with the Buckeye decision, a party favoring arbitration
88
in state court may argue that the Onvoy decision has been
effectively overruled. A close read of both decisions, however,
indicates that there is still some gray area that the Supreme Court
intentionally did not address. If a court finds that no “agreement
89
between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded,” the
court may refuse a motion to compel arbitration and instead hold a
trial on the enforceability of the arbitration clause.
The courts have not been given much direction on which
circumstances indicate that no agreement was concluded. A safe
bet, however, is that a party will include an argument that the
signature on the contract containing the arbitration provision was
forged, the person signing the contract lacked authority, the
person signing clearly exceeded his or her authority, or the person
signing was a minor or was otherwise legally incapable of
consenting. There are probably dozens of scenarios similar to
those just delineated that will require courts and litigators to make
analogies and closely parse the few words of the United States
Supreme Court.
For litigators attempting to compel arbitration, the key will be
to hammer home Buckeye’s affirmation of Prima Paint and to state
that, unless the alleged impropriety goes to the arbitration clause
itself, courts should compel arbitration. For litigators arguing for a
court hearing on the enforceability of the arbitration clause, the
90
key will be to fit themselves into the first footnote of Buckeye by
91
92
analogizing their situations to those of Sandvik and Sphere Drake.
In any case, it is evident that the void/voidable distinction is
no longer a valid test of the enforceability of a contract containing
an arbitration clause. The United States Supreme Court struck
down that bright-line rule and replaced it with the murky test of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1204.
Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).
Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1.
Id.
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001).
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“whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded.”
While the
Court’s decision was meant to narrow the situations in which a
party to a contract calling for arbitration could be heard in court, it
is still not clear which allegations are sufficient to entitle a litigant
to a court hearing. This is not exactly bad news for the Minnesota
Supreme Court, to the extent that the justices still have concerns
about sending some types of would-be litigants to arbitration,
because the United States Supreme Court left room within
footnote one for state courts to apply their own contract law and
94
determine “whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded”
between the two parties to the alleged arbitration clause.
Therefore, the void/voidable rule enunciated in Onvoy, Inc. v.
95
SHAL, LLC is no longer valid. That does not, however, mean the
Minnesota Supreme Court cannot use it generally as precedent to
mandate court trials in cases in which one party to an arbitration
clause alleges a fundamental problem with the contract as a whole.

93.
94.
95.

Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1.
Id.
669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).
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